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Blockchain systems oen employ proof-of-work consensus protocols to validate and add transactions into
hashchains. ese protocols stimulate competition amongminers in solving cryptopuzzles (e.g. SHA-256 hash
computation in Bitcoin) in exchange for a monetary reward. Here, we model mining as an all-pay auction,
where miners’ computational efforts are interpreted as bids, and the allocation function is the probability
of solving the cryptopuzzle in a single aempt with unit (normalized) computational capability. Such an
allocation function captures how blockchain systems control the difficulty of the cryptopuzzle as a function of
miners’ computational abilities (bids). In an aempt to reducemining costs, we investigate designing amining
auction mechanism which induces a logit equilibrium amongst the miners with choice distributions that are
unilaterally decreasing with costs at each miner. We show it is impossible to design a lenient allocation
function that does this. Specifically, we show that there exists no allocation function that discourages miners
to bid higher costs at logit equilibrium, if the rate of change of difficulty with respect to each miner’s cost is
bounded by the inverse of the sum of costs at all the miners.
1 MOTIVATION
Permission-less blockchain systems including the Bitcoin cryptocurrency rely on proof-of-work
consensus protocols that involve competitions among participants to solve difficult computational
problems (cryptopuzzles). ese participants, called miners, are bounded by the costs of resources
needed for computation, such as energy. e consensus protocols, however, are subject to so-
called forking aacks (51% aacks), where a miner or pool of miners having a large fraction of the
computation power in the system can asymptotically almost surely fork the blockchain to prevent
new transactions from being verified, double-spend coins, or destroy the system via dramatic loss
of confidence [1, 2]. As such, an implicit assumption in ensuring the security of the distributed
trust system is that there are a large number of independent miners with incentives to follow
the protocol. In current practice, though, a small number of participants perform the majority of
mining, oen concentrated in locales such as in China where energy costs are low [3].
One can view mining as participating in an all-pay auction [4], where the bidding strategy
captures heterogeneity amongst miners due to non-identical computational abilities and diverse
electricity costs at different geographic locations. Recall that in an all-pay auction, the bid is for-
feited whether win or lose [5]. In Bitcoin, mining involves computing the SHA-256 hash function
over and over as quickly as possible, and so the bid can be thought of as the hash rate; likewise in
other blockchain systems. Equal hash rates (bids) incur varying costs to different miners, depend-
ing on the basic cost of resources in different locales. e Nash equilibrium strategies for all-pay
auctions under complete information are such that only the two strongest players (lowest costs
of bidding) should actively participate and all others should bid zero [6]; this is exactly a concen-
tration of participants. On the other hand, there is over-participation in many practical seings
of all-pay auctions where there are many more than two participants. Several explanations for
over-bidding behavior have been suggested in the literature, including bounded rationality and
prospect-theoretic explanations [7].
Even with rational agents, overbidding behavior can emerge. In the context of crowdsourcing
contests, previous work in designing auction systems has demonstrated that reducing information
Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla and Lav R. Varshney 2
about competitors can increase participation [8–10]. When players have incomplete information
about other players’ strengths, the Bayesian equilibrium strategies involve participation by more
than two players [11]. Alternatively, when bids do not directly translate into winning or losing,
but rather only into increased chances of winning or losing, quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
strategies also promote greater participation than that of Nash equilibrium strategies [12]. (Note
that QRE is oen used to model bounded rationality of human agents, but in blockchain mining,
the auction itself has inherent uncertainty.)
Game theory has been used by several researchers in the design of secure blockchain systems
[4, 13–17], especially in the last year. Most of these efforts investigate various economic reasons
behind the centralization of Bitcoin mining. For example, Budish showed that the necessary con-
ditions for miners to be at equilibrium are very expensive, which promotes miners to sabotage via
pooling their resources [14]. On the other hand, Huberman et al. have shown that both the block
reward and the transaction fees in Bitcoin do not reflect miners’ preferences, causing temporal
fluctuations in miners’ investments [15]. Another interesting perspective on the centralization of
Bitcoin miners was given by Leonardos et al., where miners are assumed to play oceanic games, as
opposed to non-cooperative games, whichmodel interactions between small numbers of dominant
players and large numbers of individually insignificant players, as in the case of Bitcoin mining
[16]. It was shown that oceanic games in Bitcoin mining incentivize miners to join forces and form
coalitions that increase the concentration of mining power.
Like these efforts, our work also contributes further to the game theory of blockchain systems.
Specifically, we model blockchain mining as an all-pay auction to design cryptopuzzles that dis-
courageminers to adopt higher computational costs at logit equilibrium (QREwith logit responses)
with all miners actively participating. We show that it is not possible to design such a trustworthy
distributed protocol, if the blockchain system does not react sharply to the increasing miner costs.
2 MODELING BLOCKCHAIN MINING AS ALL-PAY AUCTIONS
Let M = {1, . . . ,N } denote the set of N blockchain miners, who compete against each other in
solving a given cryptographic puzzle (i.e. computing a target hash) and win a prize of value A > 0.
During this competition, each miner makes multiple aempts sequentially to solve the crypto-
puzzle. Let the outcome of the kth aempt made by the ith miner be denoted as ai,k ∈ {0, 1},
where ai,k = 1 denotes the puzzle being solved successfully. Since a crypto-puzzle can only be
solved using random guesses, it is natural to model the outcome of the ith miner at time k , i.e.
ai,k , as a Bernoulli random variable with probability P(ai,k = 1) = pi . Note that this probability
pi characterizes the difficulty-level of the crypto-puzzle at the ith agent, since smaller values of pi
needs several Bernoulli trials to obtain the outcome of ai,k = 1. Note that modeling blockchain
mining as a sequence of Bernoulli trials is not new. For example, Bagaria et al. have modeled
Bitcoin mining as a Poisson process [18].
In this paper, we assume that each player employs a different hash rate in computing the hash
function in the crypto-puzzle. Let K denote the total number of random guesses aer which one
of the miners solves the cryto-puzzle successfully. en, the ith miner wins the prize A, if
K∑
k=1
ai,k = 1. (1)
In practical seings, mining agents have non-identical computational capabilities. For example,
a miner with larger computational resources can complete the task in less effort per aempt (e.g.
average run-time to execute a pseudorandom generator), as opposed to a less resourceful miner
who needs more effort per aempt to complete the same task. is effort cost could be based on
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the cost of energy or specialized hardware availability [19]. We model this miner heterogeneity (in
terms of computational abilities and/or geo-location based disparities in electricity prices) using a
non-negative cost-bid ci ∈ R+ per aempt at the ith miner, for all i = 1, . . . ,n. Furthermore, if we
assume that the joint belief about the other agents’ cost-bids are denoted as π (c−i ), the probability
with which the ith miner solves the puzzle before other miners is given by
Qi (ci ) = Epi
[
P
(
K∑
k=1
ai,k = 1,
K∑
k=1
a−i,k = 0
 ci ,c−i
)]
,
=
∫
RN−1
pi (1 − pi )
K−1 ·
∏
j,i
[
(1 − pj )
K
]
· π (c−i ) dc−i .
(2)
en, the expected utility of the ith miner choosing a cost-bid ci is given by
Ui (ci ) = A ·Qi (ci ) − K · ci , (3)
where the first term represents the average reward obtained by the ith miner, and the second term
represents the total effort invested by the ith miner over K aempts. Since the competition ends
whenever a miner finds the target hash within the given crypto-puzzle, the individual rationality
of each miner is satiated only whenUi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,n.
Furthermore, since blockchain is known to automatically choose the difficulty of the crypto-
puzzle depending on miners’ ability profile c = {c1, . . . , cN }, we denote this allocation as a proba-
bility f (c)with which the puzzle can be solved in one aempt per unit cost (computational ability).
erefore, in the presence of multiple agents with a cost profile c = {c1, . . . , cN }, we can compute
the Bernoulli probability
pi = f (c) ·
ci∑
j∈M
c j
. (4)
In other words, the strategies available at the blockchain system (auctioneer) is to generate an
appropriate crypto-puzzle via choosing a difficulty-level that specifies pi at its miners accordingly.
On the other hand, the miners’ strategies include choosing effort-costs, which are revealed to
the blockchain system. erefore, it is natural to model this interaction between the blockchain
system and its miners as a mining auction, where the miners’ effort-costs are their bids and the
blockchain system (auctioneer) allocates the prizeA to theminer whowins the crypto-competition
whose difficulty pi is specified based on miners’ bids.
Given such an auction, our goal is to investigate the equilibrium of this mechanism. In a tra-
ditional game-theoretic seing, the equilibrium of the mechanism is defined as a strategy profile
where all the miners employ best responses to all the other miners’ responses. In other words, for
any i ∈ M, given a bid-profile c−i from all the other players, the best response employed by the
ith miner at Nash equilibrium satisfies the following conditions:
Ui (ci ,c−i ) ≥ Ui (c
′
i ,c−i ), for all c
′
i ∈ R, for all i ∈ M . (5)
Although Blockchain system usually reveals its allocation function publicly to its miners (e.g.
Bitcoin), agents may not know1 the type of other players since miners (or miner pools) may not
necessarily reveal their bids to other agents. Consequently, the miners can potentially violate
their individual rationality conditions and not necessarily follow Nash equilibrium stated in Equa-
tion (5). As noted previously, similar behavior is also observed in several auction seings where
1Although it is possible to estimate miners’ bids from historical interactions, it is impossible to know if other miners have
updated their computational capabilities in this auction round.
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human agents over-dissipate their bids and seemingly violate their individual rationality due to in-
complete information [8]. An alternate method to account for the overdissipation of bids (efforts)
is to justify decision errors using random utility models at the players [12]. More specifically, the
uncertainty in the utility ofMi in Equation (3) comes from the lack of knowledge of K in advance
and is fundamental to the blockchain seing, rather than a manifestation of bounded rationality.
erefore, in this paper, we assume that the miners choose strategies so that the mining auction
converges to quantal response equilibrium (QRE), as opposed to NE.
3 DESIGNING MINING AUCTIONS WITH QUANTAL RESPONSES
antal responses are stochastic best responses, where agents choose choices with higher ex-
pected utilities with higher probabilities. ese stochastic best responses are rationalized by the
presence of random utilities, which are traditionally studied in discrete choice models (e.g. logit
model). An equilibrium concept using quantal responses is called quantal response equilibria (QRE),
and was first proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey for normal-form games [20]. More specifically,
the utility functions of the agents are modeled via logit probabilistic rule, which results in a logit
equilibrium. Although logit models are originally proposed for discrete choice seings, Anderson
et al. have demonstrated how similar equilibrium analysis can be performed when agent’s utilities
follow a continuous logit model [12], as shown below.
πi (ci ) = δi exp
(
Ui (ci )
µ
)
= δi exp
(
A ·Qi (ci ) − K · ci
µ
)
(6)
for all i = 1, . . . ,N , where πi (ci ) is the allocation function which denotes the probability of i
th
miner solving the cryptopuzzle before any other agent, Ui is the expected utility at the ith agent
as given in Equation (3), µ is the error parameter, and δi is a constant that ensures that the density
integrates to one. Obviously, when ci = 0, we have pi = 0. erefore, δi = πi (ci = 0).
In typical Blockchain systems, miners typically join together as mining pools to gather large
amounts of computational resources, which results in a large computational cost ci at the ith
miner. erefore, our goal is to investigate how the allocation function πi (ci ) change with the
computational cost ci , at logit equilibrium. In this regard, we present the necessary condition for
the ith miner to be discouraged to have a large ci in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A mining auction discourages its miners to adopt higher computational capabili-
ties if
∂qi (ci ,c−i )
∂ci
≤
K
A
holds true for all i ∈ M.
Proof. Note that, in order to demotivate miners to accumulate higher computational capabili-
ties, we desire πi (ci ) to be a decreasing function of ci . is can happen only when
∂πi (ci )
∂ci
=
πi (ci )
µ
(
A ·
∂Qi (ci )
∂ci
− K
)
≤ 0. (7)
In other words, if qi (ci ,c−i ) = pi (1 − pi )
K−1 ·
∏
j,i
[
(1 − pj )
K
]
, an idealistic mining auction satisfies
the condition
∂Qi (ci )
∂ci
=
∫
RN−1
∂qi (ci ,c−i )
∂ci
π−i (c−i ) dc−i ≤
K
A
, (8)
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whenever agents employ quantal responses as opposed to fixed best responses. Note that, if
∂qi (ci ,c−i )
∂ci
≤
K
A
holds true, the inequality in Equation (8) holds true as well. 
In the remainder of this paper, our goal is to identify a mining auction (i.e. an appropriate
allocation function f (c)) that satisfies the condition presented in Proposition 1. In this journey,
we rely on some minor results, which are first stated as lemmas.
Lemma 1. If f (ci ,c−i ) is an increasing function of ci , pi is increasing in ci for a fixed profile c−i .
Furthermore, if f (ci ,c−i ) is
©­­­«
1∑
m∈M
cm
ª®®®¬-Lipschitz in ci , then pi is
©­­­«
1∑
m∈M
cm
ª®®®¬-Lipschitz in ci for all
i ∈ M.
Proof. We compute the partial derivative of pi with respect to ci as shown below.
∂pi
∂ci
=
∂ f
∂ci
·
ci∑
j∈M
c j
+ f ·
∑
j,i
c j
©­«
∑
j∈M
c j
ª®¬
2
. (9)
Note that the right side is always non-negative, as long as
∂ f
∂ci
is non-negative.
Now, if f is
©­­­«
1∑
m∈M
cm
ª®®®¬-Lipschitz in ci for all i ∈ M, we have
∂pi
∂ci
≤
ci©­«
∑
j∈M
c j
ª®¬
2
+ f ·
∑
j,i
c j
©­«
∑
j∈M
c j
ª®¬
2
≤
1∑
j∈M
c j
.
(10)

Lemma 2. If f (ci ,c−i ) is increasing in ci for all i ∈ M, then we have
∂pj
∂ci
≥
−ci©­«
∑
j∈M
c j
ª®¬
2
. (11)
Proof. We compute the partial derivative of pj with respect to ci for any j , i , as shown below.
∂pj
∂ci
=
∂ f
∂ci
·
ci∑
j∈M
c j
− f ·
ci©­«
∑
j∈M
c j
ª®¬
2
. (12)
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If f (ci ,c−i ) is increasing in ci and since f ≤ 1, then we have Equation (11). 
Next, we state the main result in this paper in the following theorem.
Theorem1. ere does not exist a
©­­­«
1∑
m∈M
cm
ª®®®¬-Lipschitz allocation function f (ci ,c−i ) that increases
unilaterally with ci for all i ∈ M, which discourages miners to bid higher costs at logit equilibrium.
Proof. In the following, we compute the partial derivative of дi = logqi with respect to ci :
1
дi
·
∂дi
∂ci
=
[
1
pi
−
K − 1
1 − pi
]
∂pi
∂ci
− K ·
∑
j,i
(
1
1 − pj
)
∂pj
∂ci
≤
1 − Kpi
pi (1 − pi )
·
1∑
m∈M
cm
+ K ·
ci( ∑
m∈M
cm
)2 · ∑
j,i
1
1 − pj
(13)
Since дi (c) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ pi ≤ f , we have
∂дi
∂ci
≤
1
ci f (1 − f )
+ K ·
ci( ∑
m∈M
cm
)2 · N − 11 − f
=
c2tot . + Kci f (N − 1)
ci f (1 − f )c
2
tot .
(14)
where ctot . =
∑
m∈M
cm .
From Proposition 2, the allocation function f demotivates miners to adopt higher computational
capabilities if
c2tot . + Kci f (N − 1)
ci f (1 − f )c
2
tot .
≤
K
A
. (15)
In other words, we expect f to satisfy
f 2 +
[
A(N − 1)
c2tot .
− 1
]
f +
A
Kci
≤ 0, (16)
for all i ∈ M.
In other words, if we denote cmin = min
i ∈M
ci , then it is sufficient if f satisfies
f 2 +
[
A(N − 1)
c2tot .
− 1
]
f +
A
Kcmin
≤ 0. (17)
Note that the above equation can be equivalently wrien as{
f +
1
2
[
A(N − 1)
c2tot .
− 1
]}2
+
A
Kcmin
≤
1
4
[
A(N − 1)
c2tot .
− 1
]2
. (18)
is inequality cannot be achieved since the le side of the above inequality is always larger
than the right side. 
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In other words, the theorem says that it is impossible to design a lenient allocation function for
blockchain systems that discourages miners to adopt higher computational capabilities. at is,
from the perspective of logit equilibrium, blockchain systems need to take severe actions (in terms
of controlling the mining difficulty) against its miners to discourage them towards lower costs.
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we modeled mining in blockchain systems as an all-pay auction. Since many studies
have shown that miners exhibit overbidding behavior, we investigated the problem of designing
a mining auction mechanism which induces a logit equilibrium amongst miners. We found that
the miners cannot be discouraged to bid higher costs at logit equilibrium, if the rate of change
of allocation probability f , i.e. the probability with which the cryptopuzzle can be solved in one
aempt per unit normalized-cost, with respect to each miner’s cost is bounded by the inverse of
the sum of costs at all the miners. In other words, it is necessary to punish the miners severely if
they choose higher computational costs, in order to motivate a distributed trust system. In future
work, we aim to identify allocation functions in blockchain systems whose rate of change is not
upper-bounded by the inverse of the sum of costs at all the miners. We will also investigate QRE
formulations where there is also incomplete information on competitor strengths to see how the
interaction between these two mechanism design strategies play out.
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